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COLLOQUIUM ARTICLES
REGULATORY TAKINGS: THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
BARRY APPLETON*
INTRODUCTION

The connection between Americans and private property
rights is fundamental. Whenever governmental acts interfere with
private property rights, controversy ensues.
Revolutionary
America considered British sequestering of private property a
serious matter of complaint, and this connection with property
endures in contemporary America.
In a modern regulatory state, interferences with private
property are legion and are expected. Within the United States
legal system, constitutional amendments and judicial strictures
have established a flexible system that compensates property
holders whose rights have been seriously affected by government
regulation.
The U.S. Constitution contains specific protections against
uncompensated takings in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
This same level of constitutional protection for private property
does not exist in other states. In Mexico, while there is a
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constitutional right to property,' the level of compensation can
depend on the purpose of the taking.2 In some of the most
developed democratic market economies, there is no constitutional
protection for property at all. Both the United Kingdom and
Canada have no constitutional protection that requires government
compensation for forced takings.3
Even before the term "globalization" was first used, American
investors were exporting capital and American concepts about the
protection of private property abroad. However, these American
precepts about property protection are not universally shared
within legislative regimes of other countries. To bridge this gap,
and to enhance the attractiveness of international investment,
international agreements regularly include provisions which
require compensation upon acts of expropriation.
Concerns have arisen as to whether the carefully constructed
.system of domestic takings jurisprudence can somehow be undone
through the resort to international law obligations requiring
compensation for expropriation. At its very heart, this controversy
has one simple question-do international agreements give better
rights for compensation to foreign investors under international
law than Americans receive under domestic law?
I
THE DOMESTIC U.S. LAW DEBATE

Domestic U.S. law has long struggled with a balancing of the
constitutional protection of property with the needs of government
to disturb these rights. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
recognize that private property can be taken by governmental
action and that compensation must be paid for such disturbance.
Years of subsequent litigation have created an architecture to
American takings law that would likely surprise the founding
fathers in its complexity. Non-absolute takings can constitute a
taking under U.S. law. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that governmental action that does
not encroach or occupy property can still constitute a taking if the
I

MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 27.
2 ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 393-395 (2002).
3 However, there are statutory regimes that do require compensation

varying rates for governmental takings in either country.
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effect on the property is sufficient.4
U.S. regulatory takings. jurisprudence took form in the oftencited U.S. Supreme Court decision in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City.5 In this decision over the effect of New
York City zoning regulations, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a
pre-existing regulatory framework meant that citizens have no
reasonable expectation of freedom from government regulation.6
The Supreme Court found that where a regulation places
limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically
beneficial use, a taking may nonetheless occur, dependent on a
number of factors, including the regulation's economic effect on
the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of
the government action. Under U.S. law, regulations that fall short
of absolute takings can still attract compensation if the harm is
substantial enough. In order to be sure, the court must make "adhoc, factual inquiries" and then make a decision based on the
particular circumstances of the case. 8
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme
Court spoke to the ripeness necessary for courts to find sufficient9
interference with property rights in the case of a regulatory taking.
The Court established that for there to be compensation in the case
of a regulatory taking, there must be deprivation of all economic
benefit of the property.1 ° Under the Lucas rule, if there was some
other use available for the property, there was no compensable
taking.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on the nature of takings in
a number of recent decisions. In Palazzalo v. Rhode Island, the
Supreme Court recognized that partial regulatory takings could be
compensable.1 1 One concurring opinion in that case stated that in
order to come to a decision about regulatory takings, the courts
4 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Of course, this does not

mean that all valid zoning and land use regulations constitute takings, but
unreasonable interference with property will be a taking.
5 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6 Id. at 124-25.
7 Id. at 124.
8 Id.

9 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
"oId. at 1019.
i Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S 606, 617 (2001).
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should make a "careful
examination and weighing of all the
' 12
relevant circumstances."
The Supreme Court's vigor in protecting property rights was
contained in its later decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe RegionalPlanningAgency, where the court
examined the issue of whether a temporary interference with rights
constituted a taking.' 3 In its decision, the Court attempted to lay
out basic ground rules regarding regulatory takings. Justice
Stevens, for the Court, wrote:
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property
for public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting
private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases
involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the
evaluation of a claim that there has been a "regulatory taking,"
and vice versa. For the same reason that we do not ask whether
a physical appropriation advances a substantial government
interest or whether it deprives the owner of all economically
valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical
takings context to regulatory takings claims.
Land-use
regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property
values in some tangential way-often in completely
unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would
transform government regulation into a luxury few
governments could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations
are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a
greater affront to individual property rights. 14
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has been able to establish that
the rules regarding physical takings do not easily apply to
situations of regulatory takings. The decisions establish that
regulatory takings cases require the court to look to the impact of
the regulation and to establish the existence of a substantial
impact.
In its most simple form, it is possible to conclude that while
U.S. domestic law establishes that the right to compensation in the
case of government expropriations is qualified, governments will
act in what they expect to be the public interest and courts will
determine whether and to what extent disturbances of private
12 Id.at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1470 (2002).
14 Id.at 1479 (citations omitted).

Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
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rights are compensable. The level of disturbance will have a direct
impact on the level of compensation, and disturbances that do not
create substantial harm will not create damages for technical
expropriations.
It is important to note that U.S. takings jurisprudence is
entirely sui generis to the United States. Other democratic market
economies do not share the rich American tapestry of
constitutional takings jurisprudence.
As a result, it is not
surprising to find that the American experience regarding takings
is not replicated within other domestic legal regimes.
II
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPROACHES

It has been a longstanding objective of American foreign
policy to ensure that there is a respect for private property held by
Americans in foreign states and that compensation be paid if
expropriation occurs. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull set out the Hull Formula when dealing with Mexican
expropriations of American property in 1938." s
In his
correspondence with the Government of Mexico, the Secretary of
State laid out the longstanding principles of American policy in
this area. Secretary Hull established the American view that upon
the expropriation of propriety, a foreign government owed an
investor "the right of prompt and just compensation."' 16 He
expanded this basic international law notion-which was later
termed the Hull Formula-to include "adequate,
effective, and
' 7
seized."'
properties
the
for
payment
prompt
Given the pluralistic approaches to the protection of private
property in cases of expropriation, international law has developed
its own jurisprudence to ensure that investments made by foreign
investors are protected in the case of governmental takings.
International agreements, like the North American Free Trade
Agreement
(NAFTA), 18
contain
specific
compensation
15 See

generally

3

GREEN

HAYWOOD

HACKWORTH,

DIGEST

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 653-61 (1942).
16 Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, to the Mexican
Ambassador to the United States (July 21, 1938), quoted in id. at 657.
17 Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, to the Mexican
Government (August 22, 1938), quoted in id. at 658.
18 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612
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requirements in the case of an expropriation. NAFTA Article
1110 sets out a process which requires NAFTA Parties to pay
compensation to investors of other NAFTA Parties whose
investments have been expropriated.' 9 The requirement for
compensation under NAFTA Article 1110 is absolute. If there is a
finding of expropriation, then there must be fair market
compensation in the manner explicitly set out in accordance with
the terms of the article.
NAFTA does not define expropriation.
Customary
international law is used to define whether a taking has occurred.
NAFTA does clarify the extent of compensation; however, this
textual expression seems to have codified the existing international
law position, which requires the payment of fair market value for
property. 20 A longstanding international debate about the meaning
of expropriation 2' has been rekindled by the NAFTA
compensation requirement. This international law debate has been
centered not on the issue of outright takings by governments,
which must be considered to be a well settled issue of international
law, but on those regulatory mechanisms used by governments that
can deprive private property owners of the benefits of that
property.
Under international law, the term "expropriation" refers to an
act by which governmental authority is used to deny some benefit
of property. For there to be an expropriation, it is necessary to
establish that a government has interfered unreasonably with the
use of private property. 22 This unreasonable interference principle
was recognized in the Harvard Draft Convention on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, which
states:
[a] "taking of property" includes not only an outright taking of
property but also any such unreasonable interference with the
[hereinafter NAFTA].
"9Id.art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at 641-42.

20 Id.
21 See, e.g., G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under

InternationalLaw?, 1962 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307; Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking
of Property by the State: Recent Developments in InternationalLaw, in 176
RECUEIL DES COURs 259 (1982); Burns H. Weston, "'ConstructiveTakings"
Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping
Expropriation", 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1976).
22 See, e.g., Harza Eng'g Co. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 499,
504
(1982).
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use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as to justify an
inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy,
or dispose of the property within a reasonable
period of time
23
after the inception of such interference.
International judicial officials have found both that
deprivation constitutes a taking 24 and that there is no longer any
distinction between direct, indirect or creeping expropriations. 25
This definition and application of expropriation in international
law are consistent with the U.S. legal position contained in a
comment to section 712 of the Third Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, which states:
Subsection (1) [establishing state responsibility under
international law for a taking by the state of the property of
a national of another state] applies not only to avowed
expropriations in which the government formally takes title to
property, but also to other actions of the government that have
the effect of "taking" the property, in whole or in large part,
outright or in stages ("creeping expropriation"). A state is
responsible as for an expropriation of property under
Subsection (1) when it subjects alien property to taxation,
regulation, or other action that is confiscatory, or that prevents,
unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective
enjoyment
of an alien's property or its removal from the state's
26
territory.

Similar views have been taken by other international
tribunals.2 7 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) 28 Investor-State Tribunal in Compahia del
23

Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the

Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L LAW 545, 553 (1961) (Article
10(3)(a) of the draft convention).
24 See ITT Indus. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 348, 350-352 (1983).
25 Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of
Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 255-56 (1984) (Shafeiei, Comments on Not
Signing Award) (explaining that a deprivation or taking of property may occur
through interference by a state in the use or enjoyment of a property, even where
legal title to the property is not affected).
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 712 cint. g (1986).
27 A similar interpretation of expropriation was also confirmed in Biloune v.
Ghana Investments Centre, 95 INT'L L. REP. 183, 209-210 (1989), where an
international tribunal determined that no distinction should be drawn between
direct and creeping expropriations.
28 More information on ISCID and its activities is available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid.
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Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica held that "[t]here is
ample authority for the proposition that a property has been
expropriated when the effect of the measures taken by the state has
been to deprive the owner of title, possession or access to the
benefit and economic use of his property."'2 9
Both NAFTA and international law permit expropriations to
occur as long as governments observe four fundamental
conditions: (a) that the property is taken for a public purpose;
(b) that the expropriation is conducted in a non-discriminatory
fashion; (c) that the expropriation is in accordance with
international law; and (d) that compensation is paid.3 °
International law is violated, and the duty to compensate is
triggered, whenever an expropriation occurs that is not for a public
purpose, is discriminatory, or violates principles of international
law, including due process. 31 In each of these circumstances,
international law provides that compensation must be paid.
The most controversial issue arising from the NAFTA
expropriation provisions is the compensation requirement for
measures tantamount to expropriation. This phrase has been the
subject of considerable debate in international investment law as to
whether its inclusion actually extends the customary international
law meaning of expropriation or merely fits into existing
jurisprudence.
NAFTA does not limit the ability of governments to protect
the public by taking expropriatory action, even in the use of its
"police power." However, even in cases where property is taken
for some bona fide exercise of the police power by the state,
NAFTA Article 1110 requires a government to pay full
29 Compafiia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica, Final Award

77 (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev.-FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 169, 194 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/

awards.htm.

30See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at 641-42.
" NAFTA specifies how compensation is calculated. NAFTA Article

1110(2) states:
[c]ompensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took
place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not reflect any change in
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known
earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset
value including declared tax value of tangible property, and other
criteria, as appropriate to determine fair market value.
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32
compensation to an affected foreign investor.
Several NAFTA investor-state tribunals have considered the
effect of government measures which were alleged to constitute
expropriations. As a result of these decisions, there is now greater
understanding of the meaning of this seemingly undefined term.
The NAFTA investor-state tribunal in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Government of Canada was the first to examine the meaning of
this term.33 The Tribunal concluded that the term "expropriation"
in NAFTA covered direct and indirect takings.34 As a result, the
term "measure tantamount to expropriation" did not extend the
35
meaning of this broad coverage of the expropriation obligation.
The term "tantamount" was interpreted as meaning "equivalent" to
expropriation.36 Following the well established international case
law, the Tribunal found that there must be a substantial deprivation37
before a governmental act becomes a compensable expropriation.
While the Investor's access to the U.S. softwood lumber market
constituted a property right protected by the NAFTA, Canada's
temporary imposition of its quota regime did not qualify as a
substantial deprivation, according to the Tribunal.38
The Metalclad decision, 39 released subsequent to the Pope &
Talbot Interim Award, came to a different conclusion. The
Metalclad Tribunal concluded that the re-designation of the
investor's waste recycling facility as an ecological preserve for
rare cacti constituted an act tantamount to expropriation, as the
facility could not operate at all. 40 The Tribunal held that:
expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate
and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure
or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host
32 See LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 476-80 (canvassing several recent

NAFTA decisions, which establish that regulation using the police power may
constitute an expropriation under Article 1110).
33 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award (June 26,
2000), http://www.appletonlaw.com.
14

Id. 99.

31 Id.
36

Id.

37 Id.
38 Id.

99-104.
104.
102.

39 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award (ICSID (Additional
Facility) Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID REv. - FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 168 (2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/
metalcladCorp-en.asp.
40 Id. 111, 16 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. at 197.
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State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole
or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property even
if not necessarily to the
41
obvious benefit of the host State.
Nowhere in the Tribunal's reasons did they explain why they
used the term "tantamount to expropriation" rather than
"expropriation" to cover the actions of Mexico, which would
equally apply. What appears to have occurred in Metalclad was a
finding of fact that Mexico's activities clearly constituted a
deprivation of property, described variously as expropriation,
measures tantamount to expropriation, and a violation of
international law.
Finally in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada,a third
NAFTA investor-state tribunal has maintained this controversy.4 2
The S.D. Myers claim considered the impact upon an American
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) remediation company of a
temporary export ban on PCB waste from Canada to the United
States. The Tribunal found that this was not an environmentally
related ban but a poorly disguised trade measure targeted against
U.S. firms.4 3 Furthermore, the export ban was inconsistent with
Canada's existing international environmental law commitments
under the Canada-U.S. Transboundary Agreement on Hazardous
Waste and the Basel Convention.44 While the NAFTA Tribunal
ruled against Canada for its discriminatory and unfair treatment to
the U.S. investor, it did not find that there was any expropriation.
The Tribunal adopted the decision in Pope & Talbot while not
addressing the Metalclad finding at all. The S.D. Myers Tribunal
stated:
[t]he Interim Order and the Final Order were regulatory acts
that imposed restrictions on [S.D. Myers]. The general body of
precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting
to expropriation. Regulatory conduct by public authorities is
unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint under Article
1110 of the NAFTA, although the Tribunal does not rule out
103, 16 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. at 195.
42 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award
286 (Nov. 13,
2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna41 Id.

nac/SDM-e.asp (citing with approval the Pope & Talbot Tribunal's view that the
word "tantamount" embraced the concept of so-called "creeping expropriation").
43 See id.
193-95, 40 I.L.M. at 1428.
44 Id. 103-07,40 I.L.M. at 1416-17.
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that possibility.
Expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership
rights; regulations a lesser interference.
The distinction
between expropriation and regulation screens out most potential
cases of complaints concerning economic intervention by a
state and reduces the risk that govemments will be subject to
claims 45as they go about their business of managing public
affairs.
While the NAFTA case law appears to provide two
conflicting approaches to the outer ranges of expropriation, the
findings demonstrate a unified approach. The Metalclad decision
held that the investor's deprivation was a measure tantamount to
expropriation.
The Pope & Talbot decision provides that
whenever a tribunal makes a factual finding of substantial
deprivation, then there will be an expropriation. Both of these
decisions came to a similar conclusion on the state of the law: a
government action that deprives a property holder sufficiently is an
expropriation.
Following the established practice of international law, both
tribunals required that this harm be based on a finding of fact by
the tribunal. Only "substantial" or "significant" deprivations,
rather than temporary ones, seem to be recognized by tribunals as
expropriations at this time. As a result of these decisions, it is
clear that the customary international law understanding of
expropriation has been followed by these NAFTA tribunals.
A finding that a government has engaged in expropriation is
inherently pejorative. International tribunals have attempted to
avoid findings of uncompensated expropriation in cases when
other breaches of international law could be found.46 In order to
avoid making findings of expropriation over "technical breaches"
of the law, NAFTA tribunals have adopted a test that is inherently
subjective. Like the domestic tests adopted by U.S. courts, the
international test is fundamentally based on the assessment by the
trier of fact of the seriousness of the situation. This does not mean
that all activity that is unfair or discriminatory or otherwise faulty
will constitute an expropriation-indeed, the S.D. Myers and Pope
& Talbot Tribunals both illustrated that unfair and discriminatory
41 Id.
46

281-282,40 I.L.M. at 1440.
See, e.g., id.
287-88, 301, 40 I.L.M. at 1440, 1442 (finding no

expropriation, but holding that there had been a breach of other articles of
NAFTA Chapter 11).
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conduct in itself does not warrant a finding of expropriation.
However, substantial interference with property rights by
governmental action will constitute an expropriation. In each and
every case, the international tribunal is forced to consider the
fundamental issue of whether or not the interference with the
investment was "substantial."
"A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME WOULD SMELL AS SWEET":
CONCLUSIONS AND COMPARISONS ON THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES

The definition of expropriation has been neither defined nor
shaped by NAFTA. It is a definition that has been developed and
accepted by national governments over the last hundred years. It is
because of this pre-existing international law commitment that was
already owed by all the NAFTA governments to each other (and to
the nationals of all other countries) that NAFTA did not permit any
exceptions or reservations to be made to the expropriation
obligation.
The principles of international expropriation law owe much to
U.S. foreign policy. However, the decisions of international
tribunals on the meaning of expropriation are not decisions made
by U.S. courts. The findings of international tribunals are based on
international jurisprudence, not the domestic case law of any one
country. Given their divergent antecedents, it is surprising to find
that there is so much commonality in the decisions and findings of
international tribunals and the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue of
regulatory takings. While the two areas of law have developed
from different legal traditions, they are more marked by their
similarities than by their differences. Perhaps this commonality
stems from the fact that in both systems, judges are attempting to
reconcile the pervasive nature of regulation in modem regulatory
economies with the offsetting entrenched protections for property
rights set out in their respective legal frameworks.
Basic principles of fairness underscore American common
law and international law. Domestic courts have supported some
government actions which have deprived property owners of their
property in cases where courts have found this to be fair. Under
domestic law, such owners may not receive full market value for
the value of their taken property. Indeed, in some circumstances,
property owners may not receive any compensation at all.
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International law makes no distinction about the bona fide
public policy purpose of a taking. It makes no difference from an
international law perspective whether a taking be for
environmental protection, public health or military purposes.
Indeed, international law presumes that every governmental taking
will be for a public policy purpose-but international law
guarantees compensation. Customary international law details full
and fair compensation. NAFTA details an explicit standard of
compensation which is set at fair market value at the time of the
taking.
International tribunals have now had to consider the issues of
ripeness, temporary restriction and the difference between absolute
and regulatory takings. The findings of domestic and international
courts can be compared in the following table:
ISSUE

INTERNATIONAL

DOMESTIC

Ripeness

S.D. Myers - 18 month
ban was not ripe

Pennsylvania Coal,
Tahoe-Sierra

Substantial Harm

Pope & Talbot -

Lucas, Tahoe-Sierra,

regulatory regime did
not cause substantial

Penn Central

Absolute v.

harm
Metalclad-

Penn Central,

Regulatory Taking

interference was

Palazzolo

absolute

I

_I

International and U.S. law rules regarding direct takings are
virtually identical. For regulatory takings, it is intriguing that
international tribunals have come to essentially similar conclusions
as U.S. domestic courts. In each case, the international tribunal
has come to a conclusion that is similar to the U.S. domestic law.
From the table, it is clear that many of the "cutting-edge"
issues of regulatory takings that have been considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court have been answered in similar fashion by
international tribunals. Physical takings will always require fair
market compensation. Regulatory takings that are substantial and
ripe enough to convince a judge that there is real and lasting harm
will impose an obligation for compensation under both domestic
and international law.
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Do foreign investors obtain greater substantial rights under
NAFTA and other bilateral investment treaties than under U.S.
law? The simple answer is no. While investor rights differ from
domestic U.S. rights, they are in fact very similar in substantive
effect.
In essence, expropriation is in the eye of the beholder, but an
international tribunal will not easily come to a finding of
expropriation against a national government in the absence of a
substantial amount of harm. Holders of property, whether they be
governed by domestic or international law, might seek an absolute
right to compensation to deal with all government interferences
with their property.
International law, like its domestic
counterpart, does not provide an absolute right to compensation,
but in serious cases of loss caused by governmental action,
international law does provide a specific and powerful
compensation remedy. Whether it is called expropriation under
international law or regulatory takings under U.S. law, there is
little difference in legal approach between these two different
systems. In essence, whether the rose is red or yellow, it still
smells as sweet under either legal regime.

